| 000 | 01582nab a2200301 c 4500 | ||
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_c140500 _d140500 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20230613145515.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 190424t2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_967200 _aAndersen, Dana C. |
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| 245 | 0 |
_aDo tax cuts encourage rent seeking by top corporate executives ? _btheory and evidence _c Dana C. Andersen and Ramón López |
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| 260 | _c2019 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThis paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_944974 _aGESTORES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_943504 _aEMPRESAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947462 _aINCENTIVOS FISCALES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_948221 _aREDUCCIONES TRIBUTARIAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
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| 700 | 1 |
_967201 _aLópez, Ramón |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9160195 _oOP 1634/2019/2 _tContemporary Economic Policy _w(IEF)574 _x 1074-3529 [papel] _g v. 37, n. 2, April 2019, p. 219-235 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||