000			01633nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c140326 _d140326
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230612185117.0
007			ta
008			190403t2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967134 _aMiller, G. Edward
245		4	_aThe excise tax high-cost health plans _bpotential adjustments by policymakers, employers and employees _c G. Edward Miller and Jessica P. Vistnes
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper examines the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) excise tax on high-cost health plans and simulates how tax threshold adjustments and potential behavioral responses by employers and enrollees may affect the prevalence of the tax. Our results show that threshold adjustments that account for high premiums for reasons other than the generosity of benefits, such as adjustments for the age/sex composition of the workforce and geographic variation in health care costs, make a difference in the simulated prevalence of the excise tax and may help target the tax more precisely at plans at the high end of the distribution of health benefits.
650		4	_948380 _aSEGUROS DE SALUD
650		4	_940658 _aCONSUMO
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_917793 _aAJUSTES FISCALES
650		4	_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
700	1		_967135 _aVistnes, Jessica P.
773	0		_9159860 _oOP 233/2019/1 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 72, n. 1, March 2019, p. 139-162
942			_cART