| 000 | 02298nab a2200289 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c139984 _d139984 |
||
| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20231023141424.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 190221t2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_966996 _aTóth, Csaba |
|
| 245 | 0 |
_aValuable legacy ? _bthe effect of inherited fiscal rules _c Csba G. Tóth |
|
| 260 | _c2019 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThe working mechanism of national fiscal rules depends strongly on whether a government must comply with its own rules or inherited ones. In the former case, a government usually introduces fiscal rules to show its commitment to a disciplined fiscal policy (the signaling function). In the latter context, however, inherited rules constitute external obstacles to budgetary policymaking (the limiting function). This study mainly is concerned with the limiting function and therefore bases its empirical analysis on periods when the ruling government inherited fiscal rules introduced by a previous government. The results of a panel-data econometric study indicate that national fiscal rules do contribute to disciplined fiscal policy after a change in government in times of an economic upturn. That finding, however, does not mean that the signaling function is ineffective: quite the contrary. My results, in line with the literature, indicate that the double functions of rules may complement one another. A government that introduces such rules is often already committed to a disciplined policy and wishes to signal such commitment in the short term. With the appearance of new government, however, the function of rules changes, and they efficiently promote disciplined fiscal policy in the long term. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aDERECHO TRIBUTARIO _942375 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_910414 _aDISCIPLINA FISCAL |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_944995 _aGOBIERNO |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_925831 _aANALISIS DE PANELES |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_9159273 _oOP 1443/2019/178/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 178, n. 1-2, January 2019, p. 3-30 |
|
| 856 | _uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-018-0605-6.pdf | ||
| 942 | _cART | ||