000			02070nab a2200241 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20190219124634.0
007			ta
008			190219t2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966985 _aGalendi, Ricardo André
245			_aState aid and transfer pricing _b : the inherent flaw under a supranational reference system _c Ricardo André Galendi
260			_c2018
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThis article deals with the theoretical problem of whether the arm's length principle could be derived from EU law and whether such principle would offer a single answer to the allocation of synergy rents. The author puts forward two main arguments. First, he asserts that, under ECJ case law, unless a deviation from the general tax system set forth by domestic law of the Member State (reference system) is identified, transfer pricing cases will be generally an issue of tax disparity. Therefore, the alleged advantage would not attributable to the Member State. Second, the author holds that deriving an EU law arm's length principle from Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union means to build up a supranational reference system. Such reference system is not an obvious derivation from the equality principle, but a matter of allocation of taxing rights among jurisdictions, with significant and contingent tax policy impacts. If the ECJ chooses to follow this path, it will tie future direct tax decisions to the manifold consequences of the policy elected - which currently seems to be the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 'value creation' trend. Both arguments are illustrated through an analysis of the Belgian excess profit regime.
650		4	_948095 _aPRECIOS DE TRANSFERENCIA
650		4	_932236 _aAYUDA ESTATAL
650		4	_957949 _aPRINCIPIO DE PLENA COMPETENCIA
650		4	_944303 _aFISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL
773	0		_9158613 _oOP 2141/2018/12 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 46, n. 12, December 2018, p. 994-1010
942			_cART
999			_c139949 _d139949