000			01716nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20190115133947.0
007			ta
008			190115t2018 ne ||||oo|||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_922620 _aJaneba, Eckhard
245		0	_aFiscal competition and public debt _c Eckhard Janeba, Maximilian Todtenhaupt
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato PDF en el repositorio de la Biblioteca del IEF con el nombre: 0730-2018-168JAN.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper explores the implications of high indebtedness for strategic tax setting when capital markets are integrated. When public borrowing is constrained due to sovereign default or by a binding fiscal rule, a rise in a country's initial debt level lowers investment in public infrastructure and makes tax setting more aggressive in that jurisdiction, while the opposite occurs elsewhere. On net a jurisdiction with higher initial debt becomes a less attractive location. Our analysis is inspired by fiscal responses in severely hit countries after the economic and financial crisis which are consistent with the theoretical predictions. We find a similar pattern on the sub-national level using administrative data from the universe of German municipalities.
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_942647 _aDEUDA PUBLICA
650		4	_947825 _aNEGOCIOS MERCANTILES
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
700	1		_966890 _aTodtenhaupt, Maximilian‏
773	0		_9158314 _oOP 730/2018/168 _tJournal of Public Economics _w(IEF)51900 _x 0047-2727 _g v. 168, December 2018, p. 47-61
942			_cRE
999			_c139671 _d139671