000			01985nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181218120633.0
007			ta
008			181218t2018 us ||||| ||||||0| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_963531 _aKnittel, Christopher R.
245		4	_aThe welfare impact of second-best uniform-Pigouvian taxation _b : evidence from transportation _c by Christopher R. Knittel and Ryan Sandler
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWhen consumers or firms don’t face the true social cost of their actions, market outcomes are inefficient. In the case of negative externalities, Pigouvian taxes are one way to correct this market failure, but it may be infeasible to tax the externality directly. The alternative, taxing a related product, will be second-best. In this paper, we show that in the presence of heterogeneous externalities and elasticities, this type of indirect tax performs poorly. In our empirical application, gasoline taxes to address pollution externalities, less than a third of the deadweight loss of the externality is addressed by second-best optimal taxes.
650		4	_946528 _aIMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS
650		4	_944179 _aEXTERNALIDADES
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
700	1		_966810 _aSandler, Ryan‏
773	0		_oOP 2135/2018/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal. Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _g v. 10, n. 4, November 2018, p. 211-242
856			_uhttp://resolver.ebscohost.com/openurl?sid=EBSCO:eoh&genre=article&issn=19457731&ISBN=&volume=10&issue=4&date=20181101&spage=211&pages=211-242&title=American%20Economic%20Journal:%20Economic%20Policy&atitle=The%20Welfare%20Impact%20of%20Second-Best%20Uniform-Pigouvian%20Taxation%3A%20Evidence%20from%20Transportation&aulast=Knittel%2C%20Christopher%20R.&id=DOI:
942			_cART
999			_c139499 _d139499