000			01937nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181123102610.0
007			ta
008			181122t2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966752 _aCai, Qiang
245			_a A package deal is not a bad deal _b : reassessing the method of package negotiation under the mutual agreement procedure _c Qiang Cai
260			_c2018
500			_aResumen.
520			_aMost of international tax disputes among jurisdictions have been resolved through the mechanism of the mutual agreement procedure (MAP). A long-standing concern with MAPs is that competent authorities might pursue a so-called package deal, whereby a certain taxpayer's interests would be sacrificed as part of a larger trade-off between the competent authorities. This article argues that, contrary to this common belief, a package deal under the MAP is not necessarily a bad deal; indeed, it even has the potential to strengthen the MAP mechanism. Specifically, this package deal method helps to reduce the average costs of handling MAP cases; expands the space for cooperation between competent authorities; and, if properly devised, helps to foster a stable fiscal climate. In a broader sense, the method of package negotiation also has implications for the mechanism of international tax mediation. This article adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining the topic of the MAP with transaction cost theory.
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650			_aCONVENIOS _947460
650		4	_948095 _aTRATADOS INTERNACIONALES
650		4	_940558 _aCONFLICTOS JURISDICCIONALES
650		7	_966265 _aRESOLUCIONES EXTRAJUDICIALES DE CONFLICTOS
650		4	_947823 _aNEGOCIACION
650		4	_948158 _aPROGRAMAS
773	0		_9158082 _oOP 2141/2018/10 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 46, Issue 10, October 2018, p. 744-752
942			_cART
999			_c139368 _d139368