000			02051nab a2200313 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181121133203.0
007			ta
008			181121t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_929754 _aMiravete Marín, Eugenio J.
245		0	_aMarket power and the Laffer curve _c Eugenio J. Miravete, Katja Seim, Jeff Thurk
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe study commodity taxation and characterize the Laffer curve, a trade-off between tax rates and revenue, in noncompetitive markets. Pricing in these markets leads to incomplete tax pass-through and agents re optimize their purchase and pricing decisions in response to any tax change. We use detailed data from Pennsylvania, a state that monopolizes retail sales of alcoholic beverages, to estimate a model of demand for horizontally differentiated products that ties consumers’ demographic characteristics to heterogeneous preferences for spirits.We find that under the state’s current tax policy, spirits are overpriced. Distillers respond to decreases in the tax rate by increasing wholesale prices, which limits the state’s revenue gain to only 13% of the incremental tax revenue predicted under the common assumption of perfect competition. The strategic response of noncompetitive firms to changes in taxation therefore flattens the Laffer curve significantly.
650		7	_966373 _aPRODUCTOS
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_948092 _aPRECIOS
650		4	_947725 _aMERCADO
650		4	_941715 _aCURVA DE LAFFER
700	1		_966735 _aSeim, Katja
700	1		_966500 _aThurk, Jeff
773	0		_9158148 _oOP 232/2018/5 _tEconometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society _w(IEF)21086 _x 0012-9682 [papel] _g v. 86, n. 5, September 2018, p. 1651-1687
856			_uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA12307
942			_cART
999			_c139347 _d139347