000			01856nab a2200301 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181116134822.0
007			ta
008			181116t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_917962 _aGemmell, Norman
245		4	_aThe effects of penalty information on tax compliance _b : evidence from a New Zealand field experiment _c Norman Gemmell and Marisa Ratto
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper examines the effects of late payment penalties on tax compliance based on an experiment involving New Zealand goods and service tax (GST) “late payers” using a late payment model in which the probability of enforcement, rather than detection, is central. A field experiment involving a specific compliance intervention, allows us to examine how taxpayers respond when given different penalty information, examining effects on both taxpayers' stated compliance intentions and subsequently observed behavior. Results suggest that differences in penalty information given to taxpayers and reductions in penalty rates affect compliance stated intentions but actual behavior is generally unresponsive.
650		4	_950141 _aIMPUESTO SOBRE EL VALOR AÑADIDO
650		4	_941661 _aCUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL
650		4	_947926 _aPAGO
650		4	_947813 _aINFRACCIONES Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
650		4	_947847 _aNUEVA ZELANDA
700	1		_959780 _aRatto, Marisa
773	0		_9158087 _oOP 233/2018/3 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 71, n. 3, September 2018, p. 547-588
856			_uhttps://ntanet.org/NTJ/71/3/ntj-v71n03p547-588-Effects-of-Penalty-Information-on-Tax-Compliance.html
942			_cART
999			_c139272 _d139272