000 | 02049nab a2200325 c 4500 | ||
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003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
005 | 20181116124957.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 181116t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
041 | _aeng | ||
100 | 1 |
_958697 _aHeckemeyer, Jost Heinrich |
|
245 | 1 |
_a"Home sweet home" versus international tax planning _b : where do multinational firms hold their U.S. trademarks? _c Jost H. Heckemeyer, Pia Olligs and Michael Overesch |
|
260 | _c2018 | ||
500 | _aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
500 | _aResumen. | ||
504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
520 | _aThis study analyzes whether tax incentives affect the geographical allocation of U.S. trademark rights within large multinational enterprises. Considering the S&P 500 firms, we find a strong home country concentration of U.S. trademark ownership. Our results suggest that offshore ownership of trademarks is mainly motivated by foreign activities rather than tax considerations. An analysis of the location choice reveals a significant negative impact of host-country taxes but only if controlled-foreign-company legislation does not apply. Companies active in industries that are known for producing mobile income tend to hold more trademarks offshore. In particular, trademarks of software firms and drugmakers are overrepresented in tax havens. European multinationals share similar location preferences. | ||
650 | 4 |
_943600 _aEMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES |
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650 | 4 |
_947696 _aMARCAS |
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650 | 4 |
_948233 _aREGISTRO INDUSTRIAL |
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650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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650 | 4 |
_947462 _aINCENTIVOS FISCALES |
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650 | 4 |
_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS |
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700 | 1 |
_966720 _aOlligs, Pia |
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700 | 1 |
_956380 _aOveresch, Michael |
|
773 | 0 |
_9158087 _oOP 233/2018/3 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 71, n. 3, September 2018, p. 485-520 |
|
856 | _uhttps://ntanet.org/NTJ/71/3/ntj-v71n03p485-520-Where-Do-Multinational-Firms-Hold-Their-US-Trademarks.html | ||
942 | _cART | ||
999 |
_c139270 _d139270 |