000 01780nab a2200265 c 4500
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20181029181237.0
007 ta
008 181029t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
041 _aeng
100 1 _955119
_aShapiro, Dashiell
245 0 _aTaxation and regulation in decentralized exchanges
_c Dashiell C. Shapiro
260 _c2018
500 _aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500 _aResumen.
520 _aThis article examines current regulatory models, which tend to apply enforcement at the level of “custody” and “control” over fi nancial transactions. However, with the rise of decentralized exchanges, the author asks what might happen to these models if fi nancial transactions take place without custodians. Using the example of the IRS’s defi nition of “withholding agent,” he examines arguments the IRS might use to require withholding on decentralized exchanges. In response to the rise of decentralized exchanges, the IRS and other agencies could update their regulatory approaches and apply enforcement at the level of “profi t” rather than control, using the Controlled Substances Act as a model. However, such an approach might stifl e decentralized exchange technology in its infancy. Introduction:
650 4 _947873
_aOPERACIONES FINANCIERAS
650 4 _942577
_aDESCENTRALIZACION
650 4 _947460
_aIMPUESTOS
650 4 _941016
_aINSPECCION TRIBUTARIA
773 0 _9157918
_oOP 235/2018/36/1
_tJournal of Taxation of Investments
_w(IEF)51921
_x 0747-9115
_g v. 36, n. 1, Fall 2018, p. 3-13
856 _uhttps://www.civicresearchinstitute.com/online/PDF/JTI-3601-01-Exchanges.pdf
942 _cART
999 _c139178
_d139178