000 01662nab a2200301 c 4500
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20181029111040.0
007 ta
008 181029t2018 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
041 _aeng
100 1 _964620
_aFindeisen, Sebastian
245 0 _aEducation policies and taxation without commitment
_c Sebastian Findeisen, Dominik Sachs
260 _c2018
500 _aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500 _aResumen
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies set by benevolent governments. Consistent with real‐world practices, a government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. A lack of commitment, however, affects the optimal structure of education subsidies. The direction of the effect depends on how labor taxes are designed. With linear labor tax rates and a transfer for redistribution, subsidies become more progressive. By contrast, if the government is only constrained by informational asymmetries when designing taxes, subsidies become more regressive.
650 4 _943676
_aENSEÑANZA
650 4 _943264
_aEDUCACION
650 4 _948501
_aSUBVENCIONES PUBLICAS
650 4 _948067
_aPOLITICA FISCAL
650 4 _948570
_aTIPOS DE GRAVAMEN
700 1 _964621
_aSachs, Dominik
773 0 _9157919
_oOP 1376/2018/4
_tThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics
_w(IEF)34704
_x 0347-0520
_g v. 120, n. 4, 2018, p. 1075-1099
856 _uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/sjoe.12246
942 _cART
999 _c139173
_d139173