000			02123nab a2200241 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181025134134.0
007			ta
008			181025t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_916284 _aForte, Francesco
245		0	_aIntroduction to welfare economics _c Francesco Forte
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThis is a revised version of Francesco Forte’s introductory lecture on welfare economics delivered in Charlottesville when he first arrived at the University of Virginia. It was then reproduced in the author’s mimeographed book “Introduction to welfare economics”, published by the Thomas Jefferson Center of the University of Virginia in 1961. In the “old welfare economics”, three fundamental approaches may be distinguished. Pareto’s “ophelimity” requires that someone is made better off and no one is made worse off. A similar problem is present both in Wicksell, by the rule of the unanimous consent of the electorate representative, and in the Italian School of Public Finance that requires an open competition aimed at assembling a majority that pursues a similar solution. Finally, Pigou’s paternalistic approach combines maximum national income with its optimal distribution. In the “new welfare economics”, the approach in terms of Pareto’s compensation principle does not generate a stable equilibrium; the social welfare function approach formalizes Pigou’s approach with the inclusion of paternalistic value judgements. The way out consists in combining Paretian ordinal choice with Wicksellian unanimity, with the Italian school’s suggestion of competition in collective choices, or with both.
650		4	_943749 _aESTADO DEL BIENESTAR
650		4	_942969 _aECONOMIA DEL BIENESTAR
650		4	_933421 _aBIENESTAR SOCIAL
773	0		_9157894 _oOP 1443/2018/177/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 177, n. 3-4, December 2018, p. 301-317
942			_cART
999			_c139161 _d139161