000			01828nab a2200289 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20181011144853.0
007			ta
008			181011t2018 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966609 _aOordt, Marius van
245		0	_aZero-rating versus cash transfers under the VAT _c Marius van Oordt
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aTo reduce the tax burden on the poor, nearly every VAT system allows for special treatment of certain goods or services. Zero-rating the supply of certain foodstuffs is a prominent example of this practice. Using data on South Africa, this paper considers whether taxing foodstuffs alongside compensating cash transfers may be preferred to zero-rating foodstuffs in a developing country context. The results show that cash transfers may be preferred if all the additional revenue from eliminating the zero rate can be earmarked and government is perfectly efficient. In the likely absence of earmarking and perfect efficiency, developing countries may need to apply special treatment to some foodstuffs to protect the poor. If this is the case, it is proposed that zero-rating can be preferred to the exemption of certain foodstuffs.
650		4	_93605 _aRENTAS BAJAS
650		4	_948102 _aPRESION FISCAL
650		4	_925331 _aALIMENTOS
650		4	_950141 _aIMPUESTO SOBRE EL VALOR AÑADIDO
650		4	_948221 _aREDUCCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
773	0		_9157702 _oOP 1472/2018/3 _tFiscal Studies _w(IEF)55561 _x 0143-5671 [papel] _g v. 39, n. 3, September 2018, p. 489-515
856			_uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1475-5890.12168
942			_cART
999			_c139074 _d139074