000			01574nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180921140742.0
007			ta
008			180921s2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_963163 _aHalac, Marina
245			_aFiscal rules and discretion in a world economy _c by Marina Halac and Pierre Yared
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aGovernments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated rules. If governments' present bias is small, coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, coordinated rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits enhance welfare, and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_941783 _aDEFICIT PUBLICO
650		4	_947502 _aINTERES
650		4	_948569 _aTIPOS
700	1		_955327 _aYared, Pierre
773	0		_9157398 _oOP 234/2018/8 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 108, n. 8, August 2018, p. 2305-2334
942			_cART
999			_c138880 _d138880