000			01942nab a2200301 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180816125551.0
007			ta
008			180816s2018 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966365 _aKomura, Mizuki
245			_aPay-as-you-go pension, bargaining power and fertility _c Mizuki Komura and Hikaru Ogawa
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe effects of pension policies on fertility have been examined in the overlapping-generations (OLG) model of the unitary household in which no heterogeneity exists between wife and husband. This study departs from the OLG model to focus on marital bargaining arising from heterogeneity in a nonunitary model. Specifically, this paper examines how pension policies affect the fertility of a bargaining couple with different life spans. The analysis reveals a new channel from pension policies to fertility decisions, whereby an increase in pension size affects fertility not only via the changes in current and future income but also through a change in marital bargaining power. This result suggests that an increase in a pay-as-you-go pension may induce a negative effect on fertility through women’s empowerment.
650		4	_911220 _aPENSIONES DE JUBILACIÓN
650		4	_953397 _aESPERANZA DE VIDA
650		4	_944216 _aFERTILIDAD
650		4	_947704 _aMATRIMONIO
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_953171 _aOgawa, Hikaru
773	0		_9157014 _oOP 207/2018/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 74, n. 2, June 2018, p. 235-259
856			_uhttp://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/mohr/00152218/v74n2/s3.pdf?expires=1534418387&id=0000&titleid=10500&checksum=CD3AE568F33F4EAF4727834DF70CF99B
942			_cART
999			_c138646 _d138646