000			01988nab a2200325 c 4500
999			_c138498 _d138498
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230110145824.0
007			ta
008			180710s2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_943305 _aArtés Caselles, Joaquín
245		0	_aGovernment fragmentation and fiscal deficits _ba regression discontinuity approach _c Joaquín Artés, Ignacio Jurado
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aSome electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments’ capacity to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.
650		4	_942578 _aDESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
650		4	_940424 _aCOMUNIDADES AUTONOMAS
650		4	_97289 _aADMINISTRACION AUTONOMICA
650		4	_947378 _aINGRESOS FISCALES
650		4	_941783 _aDEFICIT PUBLICO
650		4	_aESPAÑA _941092
650		4	_aANÁLISIS DE REGRESIÓN _953408
773	0		_9156836 _oOP 1443/2018/75/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 175, n. 3-4, June 2018, p. 367-391
856			_uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-018-0548-y.pdf
942			_cART