000			02202nab a2200325 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180530190942.0
007			t|
008			180530s2018 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aspa
100	1		_966173 _aArel Bundock, Vincent
245		0	_aConditional tax competition in American states _c Vincent Arel-Bundock, Srinivas Parinandi
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aCross-border commercial activity raises issues in federations where multiple jurisdictions can claim the right to tax the same income. In the United States, this coordination problem is resolved by splitting the tax base according to the geographic distribution of firms’ sales, capital and labour. The weight of each factor is determined on a state-by-state basis, which opens room for competitive legislative behaviour. In this complex issue area, however, policymakers must invest lot of resources to monitor competitors, evaluate policy alternatives and shepherd tax reform through the legislative process. This implies that highly professional legislatures should be more responsive to the policies of nearby states. We consider data on most American states over the period from 1986 to 2013 and find strong evidence of conditional spatial dependence. Our findings suggest that policy diffusion may often be moderated by institutional and political factors.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_944156 _aFEDERALISMO FISCAL
650		4	_931085 _aARMONIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_943504 _aEMPRESAS
650		4	_947647 _aLOCALIZACION
650		4	_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
700	1		_966174 _aParinandi, Srinivas
773	0		_9156389 _oOP 1793/2018/2 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 38, Issue 2, June 2018, p. 191-220
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/75DAF208D633638823EE1406C0063A44/S0143814X17000071a.pdf/conditional_tax_competition_in_american_states.pdf
942			_cART
999			_c138185 _d138185