000			01656nab a2200301 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180530142731.0
007			t|
008			180530s2018 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966170 _aWang, Hao
245		0	_aOptimal indirect taxes and subsidies under imperfect competition _c by Hao Wang
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper considers optimal indirect taxes and subsidies in an economy with imperfect competition. All commodities are taxable. A beneficent government chooses indirect tax and subsidy rates to maximize consumer utility, conditional on raising certain tax revenue. This paper finds that the government’s optimal taxes and subsidies should equalize the after-tax Lerner indexes (or price-tomarginal-cost ratios) of all commodities. The proposed tax rule eliminates the price distortions caused by market power. It thus results in welfare gain rather than deadweight loss.
650		4	_946528 _aIMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_932236 _aAYUDA ESTATAL
650		4	_948501 _aSUBVENCIONES PUBLICAS
650		4	_940216 _aCOMPETENCIA DESLEAL
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9156349 _oOP 1533/2018/2 _tJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: JITE _w(IEF)120554 _x 0932-4569 _g v. 174, n. 2, June 2018, p. 334-350
856			_uhttp://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/mohr/jite/2018/00000174/00000002/art00004#
942			_cART
999			_c138180 _d138180