000			02166nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c138087 _d138087
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221213151253.0
007			t|
008			180523s2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_955214 _aMarion, Justin
245		0	_aTax compliance and fiscal externalities _bevidence from U.S. diesel taxation _c Justin Marion, Erich Muehlegger
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aFiscal externalities across jurisdictions can arise from tax evasion and avoidance. While the tax competition literature has generally focused on base shifting and the resulting positive fiscal externalities, we show theoretically and empirically that negative fiscal externalities can dominate when the tax base is apportioned across jurisdictions. This can lead to a negative relationship between jurisdiction size and the desired tax rate. Interstate truckers in the United States owe state diesel taxes based on diesel consumption, which is apportioned based on the miles driven in each state. We find that own-state diesel sales fall when the diesel tax rates of other states rise, suggesting that tax base evasion is the predominant source of externalities. We then estimate a tax reaction specification, finding that the own-state tax rate is negatively correlated with the tax rates set in other states and with state size, both consistent with the sign of the estimated fiscal externality.
650		4	_944179 _aEXTERNALIDADES
650		4	_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
650		4	_941661 _aCUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL
700	1		_955213 _aMuehlegger, Erich
773	0		_9156268 _oOP 730/2018/160 _tJournal of Public Economics _w(IEF)51900 _x 0047-2727 _g n. 160, 2018, p. 1-13
856			_uhttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272718300276/1-s2.0-S0047272718300276-main.pdf?_tid=93b79547-ecbc-47b3-a562-00849630d917&acdnat=1527071081_3fd24cbcd52bd1a1e688484a8c507c50
942			_cART