000			02041nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c138086 _d138086
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221213151020.0
007			t|
008			180522s2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966147 _aMattozzi, Andrera
245		4	_aThe right type of legislator _ba theory of taxation and representation _c Andrea Mattozzi, Erik Snowberg
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_943408 _aELECCIONES
650		4	_948053 _aPOLITICA DE GASTO PUBLICO
650		4	_948219 _aREDISTRIBUCION
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700			_928484 _aSnowberg, Erik
773	0		_9156267 _oOP 730/2018/158 _tJournal of Public Economics _w(IEF)51900 _x 0047-2727 _g n. 159, 2018, p. 54-65
856			_uhttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272718300094/1-s2.0-S0047272718300094-main.pdf?_tid=8216f7a0-ca55-4e6c-8ed7-bf2b50dc0a36&acdnat=1527066422_7a602e604fb25a9b0ce3fba94e2d1319
942			_cART