000			02039nab a2200325 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180522150016.0
007			t|
008			180522s2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_966144 _aBellofatto, Antonio Andrés
245		0	_aRegional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization _c Antonio Andrés Bellofatto, Martín Besfamille
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation. Regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods (administrative capacity) and to raise tax revenues (fiscal capacity). Two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds. Under partial decentralization, regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs. Under full decentralization, marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes. We show that the presence of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full decentralization dominance. This condition may also be sufficient, depending on the projects' characteristics. Some extensions are presented.
650		4	_944156 _aFEDERALISMO FISCAL
650		4	_942579 _aDESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_948229 _aREGIONES
650		4	_948085 _aPOTESTAD LEGISLATIVA
650		4	_aFINANCIACION _944260
650		4	_aPRESUPUESTOS _948131
650		4	_948503 _aSUBVENCIONES PUBLICAS A LA ADMINISTRACION REGIONAL
700	1		_966145 _aBesfamille, Martín
773	0		_9156267 _oOP 730/2018/158 _tJournal of Public Economics _w(IEF)51900 _x 0047-2727 _g n. 159, 2018, p. 225-243
856			_uhttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272717302128/1-s2.0-S0047272717302128-main.pdf?_tid=4f18aa20-acf6-4061-9c20-3c974871bc74&acdnat=1526992924_6d7d9e6ffa230d8ccf99cfeb1093ba4d
942			_cART
999			_c138079 _d138079