| 000 | 01913nab a2200289 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c138078 _d138078 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20211029102531.0 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 180522r2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_966143 _aWaseem, Mazhar |
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| 245 | 0 |
_aTaxes, informality and income shifting _bevidence from a recent Pakistani tax reform _c Mazhar Waseem |
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| 260 | _c2018 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThis paper studies drivers’ responses to a ‘notched’ penalty scheme in which speeding penalties are stepwise and discontinuously increasing in speed. We present survey evidence suggesting that drivers in Germany are well aware of the notched penalty structure. Based on a simple analytical framework, we analyze the impact of the notches on drivers’ optimal speed choices. The model’s predictions are confronted with data on more than 150,000 speeding tickets from the Autobahn and 290,000 speed measures from a traffic monitoring system. The data provide evidence on modest levels of bunching, despite several frictions working against it. We analyze the normative implications and assess the scope for welfare gains from moving from a simple, notched penalty scheme to a more complex but less salient Pigouvian scheme. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_950200 _aRENTA |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_943270 _aEFICIENCIA |
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| 650 | 4 |
_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947942 _aPAKISTAN |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9156265 _oOP 730/2018/157 _tJournal of Public Economics _w(IEF)51900 _x 0047-2727 _g n. 157, 2018, p. 41-77 |
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| 856 | _uhttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S0047272717302001/1-s2.0-S0047272717302001-main.pdf?_tid=5621f58c-49e2-4f31-bd1a-560aab9e4ac7&acdnat=1526989166_b42ba92018e16beee13840fe4eebb17f | ||
| 942 | _cART | ||