| 000 | 01689nab a2200277 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20180521140220.0 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 180521s2018 ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_923506 _aKeen, Michael James |
|
| 245 | 0 |
_aBank taxes, bailouts and financial crisis _c Michael Keen |
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| 260 | _c2018 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aFollowing the Great Financial Crisis, more than a dozen countries adopted innovative bank taxes as part of their response. This paper characterizes, calibrates and discusses Pigovian taxes on bank borrowing to address externalities associated with either the collapse of systemic financial institutions or, to prevent that, public guarantees to bail out their creditors. It also characterizes optimal bailout policy, differentiating between circumstances in which the government can and cannot commit. Building on the analysis for a representative bank, it considers the implications for corrective taxation of various aspects of bank heterogeneity, connectedness, and asymmetries of information. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_932280 _aBANCOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_955516 _aCRISIS FINANCIERA |
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| 650 | 4 |
_944260 _aFINANCIACION |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_9156143 _oOP 207/2018/1 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 74, n. 1, March 2018, p. 4-33 |
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| 856 | _uhttp://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/mohr/00152218/v74n1/s2.pdf?expires=1526904849&id=0000&titleid=10500&checksum=3B8A9222B1955D4EF8EEB4DE50EA7DE2 | ||
| 942 |
_2udc _cART |
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| 999 |
_c138068 _d138068 |
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