000			02040nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c138006 _d138006
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221212175604.0
007			t|
008			180507s2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
245		0	_aBreaking the norms _bwhen is evading inheritance taxes socially acceptable? _c Martin Abraham ... [et al.]
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aUsing the example of inheritance tax, we examine the relationship between the structure of the tax and the strength of the social tax compliance norm. Based on the assumption that deviation from a legal norm is the more accepted the less its underlying principles are jeopardized, we argue that violating the tax compliance norm is socially justifiable if revenue requirements as well as equity and efficiency tax principles are not infringed upon by the evasion. Building on the literature on tax evasion, optimal inheritance taxation, and family economics, we hypothesize that a large non-declared amount of transfer and a high liquidity of the transferred asset decrease the acceptability of inheritance tax evasion and that both a high degree of kinship and young age of the heir increase the acceptance of evasion. Utilizing an experimental design embedded in a survey on the acceptance of inheritance tax evasion conducted in Germany in 2012, we confirm these hypotheses empirically.
650		4	_950219 _aHERENCIA
650		4	_948504 _aSUCESION
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_947876 _aOPINION PUBLICA
650		4	_941661 _aCUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL
700	1		_966118 _aAbraham, Martin
773	0		_9156220 _oOP 1912/2018/52 _tEuropean Journal of Political Economy _w(IEF)124230 _x 0176-2680 _g n. 52, 2018, p. 85-102
856			_uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016300969
942			_2udc _cART