000			01811nab a2200289 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180507182515.0
007			t|
008			180507s2018 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_965379 _aBurret, Heiko T.
245		1	_a(Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules _c Heiko T. Burret, Lars P. Feld
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThe paper investigates the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes by taking explicitly into account the rules’ coverage. An in-depth analysis provides unique evidence that suggests the following: First, fiscal rules reduce public deficits. The effect is stronger the better the analyzed budget position corresponds with the variable targeted by the rules. Second, cantonal debt brakes exhibit some unintended effects, i.e., an evasion into unconstrained accounts, emphasizing the importance of constraining all accounts. Third, the existence of political budget cycles depends on the institutional context, i.e., the timing of elections and the presence of debt brakes. Fifth, cantonal debt brakes dampen the fiscal deterioration during unexpected deficit shocks by more rapid fiscal adjustments.
650		4	_942375 _aDERECHO TRIBUTARIO
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_948053 _aPOLITICA DE GASTO PUBLICO
650		4	_934579 _aCICLOS ECONOMICOS
650		4	_948486 _aSUIZA
700	1		_913416 _aFeld, Lars P.
773	0		_9156220 _oOP 1912/2018/52 _tEuropean Journal of Political Economy _w(IEF)124230 _x 0176-2680 _g n. 52, 2018, p. 166-191
856			_uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016301628
942			_2udc _cART
999			_c138005 _d138005