| 000 | 01439nab a2200265 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20180425184256.0 | ||
| 007 | t| | ||
| 008 | 180425s2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_925354 _aGradstein, Mark |
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| 245 | 0 |
_aSelf-imposition of public oversight _c Mark Gradstein |
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| 260 | _c2018 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aWe argue that policymakers may have personal interests in policy restraints channeled through public oversight. Self-imposition of public oversight can be beneficial for the policymaker because it may help alleviate the dynamic inconsistency problem that she otherwise faces. In the setting studied herein, self-imposed public oversight takes the form of a ceiling on tax rates, which can be overridden only with the legislature’s consent. Such a mechanism is shown to credibly commit the policymaker to future tax restraint, thus inducing larger productive effort. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_932220 _aAUTOLIQUIDACIONES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947460 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_942888 _aESTADOS UNIDOS |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9156048 _oOP 1443/2018/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 175, n. 1-2, April 2018, p. 95-109 |
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| 856 | _uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-018-0515-7.pdf | ||
| 942 |
_2udc _cART |
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| 999 |
_c137945 _d137945 |
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