000			01581nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c137652 _d137652
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221212160553.0
007			ta
008			180327t2018 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_965925 _aDia, Enzo
245		0	_aBank taxes and loan monitoring _ba cautioanry tale _c by Enzo Dia and David van Hoose
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper analyzes a model in which there is excessive bank lending and in which regulators attempt to correct the problem with a tax. A tax on lending can correct the over-lending problem by reducing the returns from lending. Imposition of the tax has a perverse effect on the composition of lending, however, because it falls more heavily on banks that incur expenses to reduce loan losses. Hence, along the external margin, the share of banks that voluntarily monitor loans decreases. In contrast, monetary policy tightening can produce the optimal level of lending without generating any distortion of monitoring incentives.
650		4	_932280 _aBANCOS
650		4	_948108 _aPRESTAMOS
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_965926 _aVan Hoose, David
773	0		_9155308 _tThe Manchester School _w(IEF)120737 _x 0025-2034[print] _g v. 86, n- 1, January 2018, p. 1-20
856			_uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/manc.12172
942			_2udc _cART