000			01590nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180321123654.0
007			ta
008			180321t2017 us ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _besp _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_962370 _aStantcheva, Stefanie
245		0	_aOptimal taxation and human capital policies over the life cycle _c Stefanie Stantcheva
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a life cycle model with risky human capital. The government faces asymmetric information regarding agents' ability, its evolution, and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base and falls with age. Incomecontingent loans or a deferred deductibility scheme can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full deductibility of expenses and that simple linear age-dependent policies perform very well.
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_933534 _aCAPITAL HUMANO
650		4	_961790 _aEDADES DE LA VIDA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_920690 _oOP 229 _tJournal of Political Economy _w(IEF)17571 _x 0022-3808 _g v. 125, n. 6, December 2017, p. 1931-1990
856			_uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/694291
942			_2udc _cART
999			_c137590 _d137590