000			01919nab a2200289 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20180320121526.0
007			ta
008			180320t2018 us ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_964917 _aAaskoven, Lasse
245		0	_aBudget institutions and taxation _c Lasse Aaskoven
260			_c2018
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWhile a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.
650		4	_948131 _aPRESUPUESTOS
650		4	_944798 _aGESTION
650		4	_932226 _aAUTONOMIA FINANCIERA
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_948644 _aUNION EUROPEA
773	0		_9155427 _oOP 1443/2018/174/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 174, n. 3-4, March 2018, p. 335-349
856			_uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-018-0507-7.pdf
942			_2udc _cART
999			_c137573 _d137573