000			02091nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c137560 _d137560
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221103144357.0
007			ta
008			180316t2017 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_965881 _aMueller, Sean
245		0	_aState capture from below? _bthe contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending _c Sean Mueller, Adrian Vatter, Tobias Arnold
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
521			_aThis study analyses the contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending. We distinguish three dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their joint and separate effects on public spending in the Swiss cantons over 20 years. We find that overall decentralisation has a strong, significant and negative effect on the size of the public sector, thus confirming the Leviathan hypothesis. The same holds for fiscal and institutional decentralisation. However, the extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than centrally actually increases central and decreases local spending. This suggests that actors behave strategically when dealing with the centre by offloading the more costly policies. The wider implication of our study is that the balance between self-rule and shared rule has implications also for the size of the overall political system.
650		4	_944787 _aGASTO PUBLICO
650		4	_942578 _aDESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
650		4	_948486 _aSUIZA
700	1		_949132 _aVatter, Adrian
700	1		_965882 _aArnold, Tobias
773	0		_920705 _oOP 1793 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 37, issue 4, December 2017, p. 363-400
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/FCD96EC307FB84A5C0D753848ECD9CB5/S0143814X15000355a.pdf/state_capture_from_below_the_contradictory_effects_of_decentralisation_on_public_spending.pdf
942			_2udc _cART