| 000 | 01741nab#a2200289#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180219174228.0 | ||
| 008 | 170721s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aAlesina, Alberto _9484 |
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| 245 |
_aPolitical budget cycles _b evidence from Italian cities _c Alberto Alesina, Matteo Paradisi |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aPRESUPUESTOS LOCALES _948115 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aTRIBUTOS LOCALES _948620 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS LOCALES _946373 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aPRESION FISCAL _948102 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aELECCIONES _943408 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067 |
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| 650 | 4 |
_aITALIA _947518 |
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| 520 | _aThe introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 provides a natural experiment, which is useful to test for political budget cycles. The new real estate tax allowed discretion to local governments. This generatesa random variation in the distance of municipalities from the following elections when they choose the level of the tax rate. We do find substantial evidence ofpolitical budget cycles, with municipalities choosinglower tax rates when close to elections. We observe this budget cycle for smaller municipalities where the tax was more likely to be the single most important issue for the local government. Cities close to elections with large deficits did not set lower rates andso didmunicipalities with a lower average value of properties.Finally, the political budget cycle is stronger in theSouth. | ||
| 773 | 0 |
_tEconomics & _gPolitics ; v. 29, n. 2, July 2017, p. 157-177 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z148299 | ||
| 999 |
_c137271 _d137271 |
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