000			01914nab#a2200277#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219174225.0
008			170322s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aJochimsen, Beate _965235
245			_aOn the political economy of national tax revenue forecast _b evidence from OECD countries _c Beate Jochimsen, Robert Lehmann
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía. Apéndice.
650		4	_aPOLITICA ECONOMICA _948066
650		4	_aINGRESOS FISCALES _947378
650		4	_aRECAUDACION _948197
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aPARTIDOS POLITICOS _947972
520			_aSustainable budgets are important quality signals for the electorate. Politicians might thus have an incentive to influence tax revenue forecasts,which are widely regarded as a key element of national budget plans. Looking atthe time period from 1996 to 2012, we systematically analyze whether national tax revenue forecasts in 18 OECD countries are biased due to political manipulation. Drawing on theories from the field of political economy, we test three hypotheses using panel estimation techniques. We find support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic, or less pessimistic, tax revenue forecasts than do right-wing ones. Contrary to the theoretical prediction based on the ..common pool.. problem, we find that more fragmented governmentsand parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic, or less optimistic, tax revenue forecasts.We find no empirical evidence that political business cycles playa role in tax revenueforecasts.
700	1		_aLehmann, Robert _965236
773	0		_tPublic Choice _w36930 _gv. 170, n. 3-4, March 2017, p. 211-230
942			_cART
942			_z147589
999			_c137218 _d137218