000			01491nab#a2200229#c#4500
999			_c131305 _d131305
003			IEF
005			20220714111924.0
008			060119s2005 ESP|| #####0 b|SPA|u
040			_aIEF _cES-MaIEF
041			_aSPA
100	1		_aMartínez López, Diego _93012
245			_aOn states' behavior with equalization grants _c Diego Martínez López
260			_c2005
520			_aThis paper discusses how state government's behavior is affected when the so-called Representative Tax System (RTS) equalization scheme is implemented. In particular, we study the changes in the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF), and in the first order conditions for the optimal provision of public imputs. Following Smart (1998), those equalization transfers might create a price effect that induces the subnational governments to raise taxes. However, this result has to be qualified under certain assumptions. Also we find that there is anambiguous relationship between the degree of fiscal equalization and the marginal cost of providing the public input and the level of taxation. in a sense, it is not clear that more redistribution necessarily leads to more inefficiency caused by higher taxes.
650		4	_aFEDERALISMO FISCAL _944156
650		4	_aBIENES PUBLICOS _933416
773	0		_tHacienda pública española _w34570 _gn. 174, (3/2005), p. 43-54
856			_uhttps://www.ief.es/docs/destacados/publicaciones/revistas/hpe/174_Art3.pdf
942			_2udc
942			_2udc