000			01843nab#a2200301#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219173306.0
008			170420s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aLewis, Blane D. _965323
245			_aIntergovernmental fiscal transfer and local incentives and responses _b the case of Indonesia _c Blane D. Lewis and Paul Smoke
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en formato electrónico a través de la Biblioteca del IEF. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA _97307
650		4	_aCOLABORACION TRIBUTARIA _937635
650		4	_aCOOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA _953912
650		4	_aCORRESPONSABILIDAD FISCAL _941325
650		4	_aHACIENDAS LOCALES _945217
650		4	_aINCENTIVOS FISCALES _947462
650		4	_aINDONESIA _947477
520			_aIndonesian policymakers are convinced that a number of perverse incentives are embedded in their system of intergovernmental transfers. Officials in countries throughout the developing world have similar views about their own intergovernmental frameworks. In Indonesia, perverse incentives are thought to negatively influence a wide range of local government fiscal behaviours, including as regards own-source revenues, spending and savings. An empirical analysis ofthe local government response to transfers, however, offers only mixed support for the existence and strength of the presumed incentives. Overall, the findingsin this paper highlight the benefits to central governments of rigorously examining assumed perverse incentives in their intergovernmental frameworks before embarking on attempts to expunge them.
700	1		_aSmoke, Paul _965324
773	0		_tFiscal Studies _w55561 _gv. 38, n. 1, March 2017, p. 111-139
942			_cART
942			_z147808
999			_c129236 _d129236