000			02072nab#a2200277#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219170112.0
008			171214s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aHeathcote, Jonathan _916184
245			_aOptimal Tax Progressivity _b An Analytical Framework _c Jonathan Heathcote,Kjetil Storesletten, Giovanni L. Violante
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aPROGRESIVIDAD _948160
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
520			_aWhat shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. On the other hand, progressivity reduces incentives to work and toinvest in skills, distortions that are especially costly when the government mustfinance public goods. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preference, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the desire to finance government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limitingoptimal progressivity. In a version of the model where poverty constrains skill investment, optimal progressivity is close to the U.S. value. An empirical analysis on cross-country data offers support to the theory.
700	1		_aStoresletten, Kjetil _91282
700	1		_aViolante, Giovanni L. _954041
773	0		_tThe Quarterly Journal of Economics _w55704 _gv. 132, n. 532, issue 4, November 2017, p. 1693-1754
942			_cART
942			_z149269
999			_c102983 _d102983