000			01523nab#a2200265#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219170112.0
008			171214s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aBoadway, Robin William _96216
245			_aOptimal Income Taxtaion and Job Choice _c Robin Boadway, Zhen Song, Jean-François Tremblay
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Bibliografía. Conclusión.
650		4	_aTRABAJO _948201
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
520			_aIn this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different jobtypes exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive-margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first-best maximin utility can be achieved in the second-best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.
700	1		_aSong, Zhen _964030
700	1		_aTremblay, Jean François _951754
773	0		_tThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics _w34704 _gv. 119, n. 4, 2017, p. 910-938
942			_cART
942			_z149260
999			_c102980 _d102980