000			02203nab#a2200289#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219170110.0
008			171018s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aWeitzman, Martin _953992
245			_aOn a World Climate Assembly and the social cost of carbon _c by Martin L.Weitzman
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Conclusión. Apéndice. Bibliografía.
650		4	_aCARBON _933524
650		4	_aINDUSTRIA DEL CARBON _946592
650		4	_aPRECIOS _948092
650		4	_aCONTAMINACION ATMOSFERICA _940897
650		4	_aEXTERNALIDADES _944179
650		4	_aMEDIO AMBIENTE _947492
650		4	_aCONSERVACION _940598
520			_aThis paper argues that a uniform global tax-like price on carbon emissions, whose revenues each country retains, can provide a focal point for a reciprocal common climate commitment, whereas quantity targets, which do not nearly so readily present such a single focal point, tend to rely ultimately on individual quantity commitments. The paper postulates the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic .World Climate Assembly. (WCA) that votes for a single worldwide price on carbon emissions via the basicdemocratic principle of one person,one vote majority rule. A WCA-like uniform price-tax counters selfinterest by incentivizing countries or agents to internalize the externality because each WCAagent.s higher abatement cost from a higher emissions price is counterbalanced by that agent.s extra benefit from inducing all other WCA agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. Thepaper derives fresh insights and new simple formulae that relate each emitter.s most-preferred world Price of carbon to the world .social cost of carbon. (SCC), and further relates the WCA-voted world price ofcarbon to the world SCC. Some implications arediscussed. The overall methodology of the paper is a mixture of mostly classical with some behavioural economics.
773	0		_tEconomica _w89753 _gv. 84, n. 336, October 2017, p. 559-586
942			_cART
942			_z148694
999			_c102961 _d102961