| 000 | 01654nab#a2200313#c#4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 003 | IEF | ||
| 005 | 20180219170109.0 | ||
| 008 | 170721s2017 GBR|| #####0 b|ENG|u | ||
| 040 | _aIEF | ||
| 041 | _aENG | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aKumru, Cagri _954889 |
|
| 245 |
_aOptimal capital income taxation with means - tested benefits _c Cagri S. Kumru and John Piggott |
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| 260 | _c2017 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible en línea a través del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Bibliografía. Conclusión. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_aCAPITAL _933516 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aRENTA _950200 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aRENDIMIENTOS DE CAPITAL _948255 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS _947460 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aEDAD DE JUBILACION _943203 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aPENSIONES _948000 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776 |
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| 520 | _aThis paper studies the interaction between capital income taxationand a meanstestedage pension. Our results document that the existence of a social insurance program financed from general revenue puts an upward pressure on the optimal tax rate. We also show that there is a negative relation between taper (benefitreduction) and optimal capital income tax rates. The potential welfare gain fromoptimizing capital taxation in the presence of a universal retirement transfer system is relatively higher. However, when the transfer is substantially means tested, the gain is lower, because the means test effectively operates as a tax on retirement capital. | ||
| 700 | 1 |
_aPiggott, John R. _935549 |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_tScottish journal of political economy _w68988 _gv. 64, n. 3, July 2017, p. 227-262 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||
| 942 | _z148301 | ||
| 999 |
_c102939 _d102939 |
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