000			01894nab#a2200277#c#4500
003			IEF
005			20180219170108.0
008			170404s2017 USA|| #####0 b|ENG|u
040			_aIEF
041			_aENG
100	1		_aJenkins, David Randall _965266
245			_aTreasury's passive activity interest abuse of power _c David Randall Jenkins
260			_c2017
500			_aDisponible también en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión.
650		4	_aPROPIEDAD INMOBILIARIA _948169
650		4	_aINVERSIONES _947531
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
650		4	_aPLUSVALIAS _943197
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
520			_aThe tax law resource allocation battle among closely held business, real property, and capital market investments has a long history. The introduction of Section 469's passive activity loss rules by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealt a devastating blow to the two former categories in favor of the last. Congress.s announced 1986 policy goal was to limit tax sheltering activities so as to provide a more level and equitable playing field to accommodate foreseeable reductions in tax rates for all taxpayers. But Section 469's overreaching unfavorable risk-return combination and resource allocation consequences immediately manifested themselves. Within two years, the devastation's scope became apparent. Treasury responded by promulgating Treasury Regulation Section 1.469-2T(c)(2) to somewhat restore resource allocation parity. In the author.s opinion, Treasury'sview on passive activity interest disposition gains is inconsistent with legislative intent and public policy, however, and therefore should be retracted.
773	0		_tJournal of Taxation of Investments _w51921 _gv. 34, n. 3, Spring 2017, p. 51-69
942			_cART
942			_z147667
999			_c102923 _d102923