Runs versus Lemons information disclosure and fiscal capacity Miguel Faria e Castro, Joseba Martínez and Thomas Philippon
By: Faria e Castro, Miguel
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Contributor(s): Martínez, Joseba | Philippon, Thomas.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): CAPACIDAD FISCAL | IMPUESTOS | CRISIS FINANCIERA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
In:
The review of economic studies v. 84 (3), n. 301, October 2017, p. 1683-1707Summary: We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops duringfinancial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In ourmodel, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy.Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how theycan end up spending less than governments that are more fiscallyconstrained.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 558/2017/301 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 558/2017/301 |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. Conclusión.
We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops duringfinancial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In ourmodel, governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy.Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how theycan end up spending less than governments that are more fiscallyconstrained.
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