Intergenerational disagreement and optimal taxation of parental transfers Nicola Pavoni and Hakki Yazici
By: Pavoni, Nicola
.
Contributor(s): Yazici, Hakki.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2017Subject(s): TRANSMISION DE BIENES | DONACIONES | SUCESION | IMPUESTOS | IMPOSICION OPTIMA | MODELOS ECONOMETRICOS | FAMILIA
In:
The review of economic studies v. 84 (3), n. 300, July 2017, p. 1264-1305Summary: We study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers ina model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents. perspective, optimal policyinvolves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do notrely on the assumption of differentiability of the agents.policy functions.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEF | OP 558/2017/300-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 558/2017/300-2 |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Bibliografía. Resumen. Conclusión.
We study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers ina model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents. perspective, optimal policyinvolves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do notrely on the assumption of differentiability of the agents.policy functions.
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