A case for higher corporate tax rates by Edward Fox and Zachary Liscow
By: Fox, Edward
.
Contributor(s): Liscow, Zachary
.
Material type: 




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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 138-Bis/2020/98/12-2 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 138-Bis/2020/98/12-2 |
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Disponible también en formato electrónico.
Resumen.
In this article, the authors argue that while conventional wisdom holds that we should lower taxes on corporations because of international competition, two recent changes militate in favour of higher corporate taxes, which would close the deficit, fund social programs, and reduce inequality. First, changes in tax law have increasingly targeted the corporate tax at economic rents, the supersized returns that businesses receive when they enjoy advantages like market power. Because taxing rents is progressive and does little to harm economic activity, a higher rate is justified. Second, shifts in the U.S. economy have allowed companies to earn more economic rents, increasing the revenue a tax on rents could raise and increasing the appeal of the tax as a deterrent to harmful behaviour like lobbying government officials to get or maintain market power. Although the authors cannot say exactly what the corporate rate should be, principally because the international dimension remains so important, they offer reasons to favour a higher rate and describe reforms that could help ease the adoption of higher, but still efficient, taxes on corporate returns. They suggest that at a minimum, proponents of lower corporate tax rates present an incomplete picture and that the "lower corporate tax rates" conclusion is a non-obvious one.
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