What is really wrong with global tax governance and how to properly fix it Tarcisio Diniz Magalhães
By: Magalhães, Tarcisio Diniz
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2018Subject(s): FISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL | ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES | TOMA DE DECISIONES | POLITICA FISCAL
In:
World Tax Journal ; v. 10, n. 3, August 2018, p. 499-536Summary: During the course of the last 100 years, the wealthiest and most powerful nations on the planet have systematically gathered around in small groups of experts, scientific committees and working parties, under the auspices of the League of Nations and the OECD, to decide on the appropriate tax policy norms for global implementation. The immediate consequence was, and still is, the creation of an exclusionary architecture that deprives the majority of the world's countries from meaningfully influencing legal-institutional choices vis-à-vis what countries should tax cross-border transactions, a process that has clear global distributional implications. This article sets off to investigate this process of exclusion. It identifies two central elements that constrain broad participation in global tax governance, engendering the under-representation of the interests of developing countries: expertise and power.
| Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recursos electrónicos | IEF | IEF | WTJ/2018/4-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | WTJ/2018/4-1 |
Disponible únicamente en formato electrónico.
Resumen.
During the course of the last 100 years, the wealthiest and most powerful nations on the planet have systematically gathered around in small groups of experts, scientific committees and working parties, under the auspices of the League of Nations and the OECD, to decide on the appropriate tax policy norms for global implementation. The immediate consequence was, and still is, the creation of an exclusionary architecture that deprives the majority of the world's countries from meaningfully influencing legal-institutional choices vis-à-vis what countries should tax cross-border transactions, a process that has clear global distributional implications. This article sets off to investigate this process of exclusion. It identifies two central elements that constrain broad participation in global tax governance, engendering the under-representation of the interests of developing countries: expertise and power.
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