Who did the ethanol tax credit benefit? an event analysis of subsidy
By: Bielen, David A
.
Contributor(s): Newell, Richard G
| Pizer, William Aaron
.
Material type: 




Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Artículos | IEF | IEF | OP 730/2018/161-1 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 730/2018/161-1 |
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OP 730/2018/160 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/160-1 Tax compliance and fiscal externalities | OP 730/2018/161 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/161-1 Who did the ethanol tax credit benefit? | OP 730/2018/162 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/163 Journal of Public Economics | OP 730/2018/164 Journal of Public Economics |
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Resumen.
Bibliografía.
At the end of 2011, the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), which had subsidized the blending of ethanol in gasoline, was allowed to expire. During its tenure, the subsidy was the subject of intense scrutiny concerning who benefited from its existence. Using commodity price data, we estimate the subsidy incidence accruing to corn farmers, ethanol producers, gasoline blenders, and gasoline consumers around the time of
expiration. Our empirical approach contributes methodologically to the event studies literature by analyzing futures contract prices (as opposed to spot prices) when possible. Ultimately, we find compelling evidence that, at the date of VEETC expiration, ethanol producers captured about 25¢ of the 45¢ subsidy per gallon of ethanol blended. We find suggestive, albeit inconclusive, evidence that a portion of this benefit (about 5¢ per gallon) was passed further upstream from ethanol producers to corn farmers. Most of the remainder seems most likely to
have been captured by the blenders themselves. On the petroleum side, we find no evidence that oil refiners
captured any part of the subsidy. We also find no evidence that the subsidy was passed downstream to gasoline consumers in the form of lower gasoline prices.
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