Taxpayer behavior when audit rules are known evidence from Italy Alessandro Santoro and Carlo V. Fiorio
By: Santoro, Alessandro
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Contributor(s): Fiorio, Carlo V
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Material type: 





Item type | Current location | Home library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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IEF | OP 581/2011/1-5 (Browse shelf) | Available | OP 581/2011/1-5 |
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OP 581/2011/1-2 Tax compliance as an evolutionary coordination game | OP 581/2011/1-3 Dynamic scoring, tax evasion and shadow economy | OP 581/2011/1-4 Undeclared work, employer tax compliance and audits | OP 581/2011/1-5 Taxpayer behavior when audit rules are known | OP 581/2011/1-6 Fighting income tax evasion with positive rewards | OP 581/2011/1-7 What goes around comes around ? | OP 581/2011/1-8 Methods to reanalyze tax compliance experiments |
Disponible en línea a través de la Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Resumen. Conclusión. Bibliografía.
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